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Introduction
The idea that democracy is inextricably linked to nonviolent conflict resolution endeavors has increasingly directed US foreign policy decisionmaking in the postCold War era. Not only did President Clinton use the democratic peace argument to defend the expansion of US trade ties, but the administration also argued that the enlargement of NATO into Eastern Europe would help cement the recent democratic gains in the region (see Lake, 1994; Albright, conflict literature led Eyerman & Hart (1996: 598) to conclude that increased attention needs to be given to identifying specific characteristics of democratic states that might mitigate or incite coercive foreign policy actions. Given that distinctions within the democratic community of nations have been found with regards to conflict propensity (Prins & Sprecher, 1999; Ireland & Gartner, 2001 ), a more nuanced understanding of institutional effects is needed to explain fully crisis bargaining behavior. Some scholars, for instance, have tested the relationship between conflict involvement and executive constraints (Partell, 1997; Partell & Palmer, 1999) . In general, though, these findings do not differ drastically from what has been found with overall level of democracy.1 To date, few other institutional elements of polities have been investigated systematically for their potential effect on conflictual foreign policy behavior. However, it may be that other features of the domestic political environment have an important effect on conflict proneness. If so, an index of these separate institutional elements that make up a polity might obscure a relationship between any one of them and foreign policy decisionmaking. Drawing on Schultz (1998) and Gartzke (2001) , and following the suggestions of Eyerman & Hart (1996) and Gleditsch & Ward (1997) , this article begins to pull apart a standard measure of polity characteristics. One conceptual element of a regime's makeup is examined: political participation.
The article proceeds as follows. First, I discuss crisis bargaining and Fearon's (1994) notion of audience costs. Next, I argue that the believability of audience costs and/or resolve depends in part on the stability of domestic political structures. Similar to Schultz (1998) , I suggest that political opposition is a key component of audience cost signaling, and therefore uncertainty regarding the stability of a regime's political competition naturally has an impact on foreign policy decisionmaking. To test this conjecture, I examine dispute reciprocation from 1816 to 1992. That is, given a dispute, does instability in political competition increase the likelihood of conflict reciprocation? The results indicate that while democracy has little effect on MID reciprocation, factionalism among domestic political groups (that is, non-institutionalized political participation) tends to be strongly associated with such a dispute response. Contiguity, military balance, and years at peace also appear to influence dispute reciprocation. I conclude by offering suggestions for future research.
Regime Type and Crisis Bargaining
According to Gleditsch (1995: 297) , 'the importance of democracy lies in it being a near-perfect sufficient condition for peace'. At the dyadic level, in particular, the empirical evidence is both statistically and substantively strong, as well as robust to charges of specification bias. Not only have democracies rarely engaged each other in full-scale war, but democratic leaders also appear to avoid lower levels of militarized conflict with each other as well. Still, logical flaws in the primary explanations for the democratic peace have led some scholars to question the posited causal relationship between political institutions, norms of compromise, and pacific foreign policy behavior. Gartzke (2001) , for example, insists that both the normative and structural arguments are fundamentally monadic and thus cannot fully explain the dyadic observation. What may distinguish the conflict proneness of coherent polities from factional ones, then, is the believability of domestic audience costs. In fully institutionalized polities, stable sets of rules and norms exist that predictably constrain behavior by legitimating elite signaling. These longstanding features of the political environment ensure that bluffing (that is, the manipulation of audience costs) is more difficult. In transitional polities there is greater uncertainty about the role of domestic political institutions and how they structure elite decisionmaking.8 Consequently, there may be a good deal of uncertainty regarding the actual political costs state leaders face from policy failure.
The difficulty political leaders have in interpreting signals may not so much involve restricted versus competitive political participation, but more the stability of the political process. While political opposition helps to validate elite signals, uncertainty contributes to continued probing behavior. So, states 7 If a reputation for resolve is as important as resolve itself, then leaders of unstable or transitional polities also may use disputes to establish a regional or international reputation. 8 While Fearon (1994) expects states that cannot generate audience costs to engage on average in more costly and less efficient bargaining behavior, a democracy-autocracy distinction may not be the most useful in determining which states can or cannot generate audience costs. Indeed, conflict propensities differ within both the democratic and the non-democratic communities of nations. Certain states within both camps are simply better at signaling their preferences and resolve and thus determining conflicts more quickly and efficiently. On average, non-democracies should be more conflict-prone due to less efficient signaling. But, regimes with factional participation should be problematic regardless of the other institutional elements they might possess.9
In states with factional or unstable competition, not only might elites misperceive their own domestic political opposition, but signals from adversaries that suffer from unstable political participation should at times be discounted. We know, for instance, that the absence of an enduring institution to journal of PEACE RESEARCH legitimate elite signaling should increase the likelihood that leaders will bluff. And, as the ability of the initiating state to bluff increases, signals of resolve become less effective. The problem with polities characterized by the oscillation between severe restrictions on political opposition and competitive participation is that foreign adversaries are unsure whether opposition groups can challenge government policies and thus impose costs on leaders. So, uncertainty and intense factionalism lead to more escalatory crisis bargaining as elites attempt to ascertain each other's preferences and resolve. Expectations While Gleditsch & Ward (1997: 381) found constraints placed on the executive to be the most important factor determining a state's overall polity score, they reason that 'by looking inside the characteristics of polities rather than concerning ourselves only with whether they are classified at one extreme or the other, we may learn about the processes that undergird their fundamental behavioral differences'. It is argued here that non-institutionalized (that is, factional) political participation may help account for crisis bargaining behavior. This is because political instability prevents political elites from successfully signaling their true intentions and preferences in dispute situations. The research design presented below is intended to empirically test whether reciprocation rates vary depending on the instability of domestic political competition. Based on the discussion above, two basic hypotheses are proposed. 
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Data Analysis
Tables I-III present the results of 9 logit models that assess the influence of political participation, power, contiguity, regime type, alliance ties, and dispute salience on bilateral conflict reciprocation. Models 1 and 2 model the decisionmaking of the target state, while controlling only for the polity characteristics of the initiating state. Models 3-5 use joint measures of unstable and stable political participation, and models 6-9 include separate measures for the regulation and competitiveness of political participation. The results in Table I indicate that unstable political participation within the initiating state increases the likelihood of reciprocation 19 Polity IIId was used to determine membership in the international system. Summing the ages of the two states involved in the dispute generated the combined age variable.
by the target. That is, factional or transitional political participation within state A contributes to escalatory crisis bargaining. With domestic opposition that may or may not possess the ability to challenge a leader, the initiating state's signal of concern and resolve contains a higher level of uncertainty. It appears that the target state is responding to such uncertainty with attempts to glean greater information from the initiating state.
As expected, the overall polity index of the initiating state, based on constraints, openness, and competitiveness, tends to reduce the target's propensity to reciprocate. While the statistical significance of this variable warrants some concern, it is interesting that target states, regardless of their regime type, reciprocate less often when the initiating state is a democracy. Holding all other variables at mean values, democratic initiators are reciprocated against 15% less than nondemocratic initiators. As Fearon (1994) expects, disputes appear to be resolved more quickly due to the more reliable signaling coming from the democratic initiator.
Despite the evidence on regime type in Table I , the results in Table II indicate Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is whether or not the dispute was reciprocated. Column 4 represents the change in probability Y, after fluctuating each independent variable one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean (except dichotomous variables, which are fluctuated from 0 to 1) while holding all other independent variables at their mean values. ***p &lt; .01; **p &lt; .05; *p &lt; .10 target states, regardless of their polity type, react similarly to democratic or high audience cost initiators. If states use militarized disputes to reduce uncertainty, then more enduring political institutions, be they restrictive or competitive, provide more information about the preferences of, and constraints on, political elites. Whereas joint democracy has little or no effect on crisis bargaining, joint political participation has an important impact. Bilateral disputes in which both states possess unstable political participation have a much higher likelihood of experiencing reciprocation. That is, initiator states with factional or transitional participation are much more likely to be challenged in disputes than more stable polities. Most likely, given the greater chance of bluffing, target states are testing the resolve of the initiator. This result is much stronger when both sides possess factional or transitional participation structures. In fact, the probability of reciprocation increases by over 18%, from 44% to 52%, when both 78 journal of PEACE RESEARCH Tables I and II are Contiguity and peace years also affect dispute reciprocation in the directions hypothesized. First, neighboring states have a higher probability of conflict reciprocation than states geographically farther apart. The effect is quite large, with the probability of reciprocation increasing by over 35%. It seems that for these militarized bargaining situations, distance often precludes even minor militarized responses. Second, the peace-years variable indicates that peace does beget peace, or at least longer periods of peace between two states results in less coercive foreign policy strategies. A change of one standard deviation around the mean decreases the probability of reciprocation by over 20%.21 Given the construction of this variable, lower values actually equate with longer periods of peace, and this thus explains the positive sign on the coefficient.
Learning also appears to influence crisis bargaining behavior. The combined age of the states involved in the militarized dispute has a pacifying effect on reciprocation. That is, the likelihood of dispute reciprocation decreases as the combined age of the belligerents increases. In fact, going from a combined age of 58 years to a combined age of 224 years (a one standard deviation change around the mean) decreases the probability of reciprocation by over 16%. It appears that age may endow states with more effective signaling, allowing leaders to resolve conflicts earlier in the bargaining relationship.22
One of the most significant factors influencing dispute reciprocation is whether the dispute involved a maritime seizure. Seizure MIDs, it seems, rarely evoke retaliatory militarized demands. Indeed, the evidence from the logistic models indicates that only in rare circumstances are these quarrels reciprocated. With all other variables held at their mean values, a non-seizure dispute has about a 50% chance of reciprocation. In comparison, a seizure dispute has less than a 30% chance. Interestingly, formal alliance ties have little influence on dispute reciprocation. Although the defense pact measure, as expected, is inversely related to the decision by B to escalate (that is, security alignment tends to decrease the probability of conflict reciprocation), its substantive impact is quite small. It appears that while alliance ties may have an important effect on the outbreak of war, states with formal defense pacts demonstrate little reluctance to reciprocate militarized disputes.
Regulation and Competitiveness
The analysis in Table II only when both states suffered from instability in both dimensions of political participation did the variable get coded a one. There is no reason, however, to think that these separate measures will have an equivalent impact on dispute reciprocation. As such, four additional models are included to assess the independent influences of these similar, yet distinct, factors. Models 6 and 7 consider disputes where both states suffer from factionalism in the regulation of political participation, while models 8 and 9 do the same for political competition. As before, measures of regulated and competitive participation are also included.
The results in Table III indicate that the regulation of political participation has a stronger influence on dispute reciprocation than competitiveness. It appears that the degree of institutionalization of political participation strongly affects crisis decisionmaking. When regimes fluctuate between regulated and unregulated participation, mixed messages are being sent to foreign adversaries. In fact, in disputes where both states possess unstable political regulation, the likelihood of conflict reciprocation increases by 14%. Interestingly, militarized disputes between democracies that are characterized by non-institutionalized political participation, such as Honduras-Nicaragua in 1989, Peru-Ecuador in numerous years, India-Pakistan, and Malaysia-Philippines in 1988, have a very high probability of reciprocation -nearly 60%. Bilateral disputes involving non-democracies, such as SyriaLebanon in 1963, Argentina-Chile in 1900 and 1905, also have a high likelihood of reciprocation, but over 10% less than democratic disputes. It seems that vacillation in political regulation has a more dangerous effect on regimes with some level of democratic political structure.
Given that the competitiveness of political participation comes only after a certain degree of regulation has been established, a smaller secondary effect should be expected. The primary impact stems from whether the political environment experiences significant fluctuation between institutionalized and non-institutionalized political participation. However, in regulated political contexts, patterns of political competitiveness that oscillate between restrictive and enduring competition do tend to increase the likelihood of dispute reciprocation. From a crisis bargaining perspective, such behavioral differences make sense. Political participation that is either restricted or competitive provides a stable, wellinstitutionalized political environment that contributes to accurate signaling. The evidence indicates that there is little difference in terms of conflict propensity between states that possess competitive participation and those that have restricted participation. A political environment that varies widely between restriction and competition leads to greater uncertainty and misperception in the bargaining relationship. Escalatory behavior is the observed result.
Conclusion
While democracies rarely initiate disputes and even more rarely initiate against other democracies, scholars still disagree on the precise elements of a democratic state that help to pacify foreign policy decisionmaking. The conventional view of the democratic peace maintains that political culture and representative institutions that disperse war powers help to prevent the use of violent coercion against other democracies. Yet neither an institutional nor a normative argument effectively accounts for why or how democratic states adjust their bargaining behavior depending on the polity of the opposing state. Fearon (1994) Robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is whether or not the dispute was reciprocated. Column 6 represents the change in probability Y, after fluctuating each independent variable one standard deviation below the mean to one standard deviation above the mean (except dichotomous variables, which are fluctuated from 0 to 1) while holding all other independent variables at their mean values. ***p< .01; **p< .05; *p < .10 culture, but is a result of efficient signaling between political elites. Fearon (1994) maintains that a political penalty for foreign policy failure allows more efficient signaling during crises, thus allowing political elites to resolve their differences with little or no escalation. Since the nature of a democratic political system 'makes it costly for liberal executives to bluff', as Gartzke (2001: 7) insists, leaders are less likely to need threats and uses of military force to demonstrate resolve. According to Eyerman & Hart 
